Douglas Diamond and Philip Dybvig. 1983. "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity." Journal of Political Economy 91: 401-19.



Douglas Diamond



Philip Dybvig

- three periods: T = 0, 1, 2
- a single good
- a continuum of agents with measure 1
- Each agent is endowed with 1 unit of the good in period 0.

#### The Model: Asset Return

$$T = 0 \qquad T = 1 \qquad T = 2$$
$$-1 \qquad \begin{cases} 0 & R \\ 1 & 0 \end{cases}$$

#### The Model: Preferences

- In period 0, all agents are identical.
- In period 1, some agents become "patient" and others become "impatient". (private information)

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ullet \left\{egin{array}{ll} u(c_1) & 	ext{if impatient} \ & & & & \ u(c_2) & 	ext{if patient} \end{array}
ight.
```

ullet The probability of being impatient is  $\lambda$  for each agent in period 0.

#### Autarky

- autarky:
  - utility of the impatient in period 1: u(1)
  - utility of the patient in period 2: u(R)
  - expected utility in period 0:  $\lambda u(1) + (1 \lambda)u(R)$
- 1 < R
  - "insurance" against the liquidity shock is desirable.

#### Banking Economy

- Banks offers demand deposit contract  $(d_1, d_2)$ .
- Agents
  - make deposits in period 0.
  - withdraw  $d_1$  in period 1.
  - or withdraw  $d_2$  in period 2.
- free-entry banking sector:  $(d_1, d_2)$  maximizes the depositor's expected utility.


### Optimal Deposit Contract

$$\max_{d_1,d_2} \lambda u(d_1) + (1-\lambda)u(d_2)$$


$$\underbrace{(1-\lambda)d_2}_{\text{withdrawals in period 2}} \leq \underbrace{(1-\lambda d_1)R}_{\text{resources in period 2}} \quad (RC)$$

$$d_1 \leq d_2 \quad (IC)$$

# Optimal Deposit Contract:



## Optimal Deposit Contract:



### What do banks do?

- $u'(d_1^*)/u'(d_2^*) = R$
- $u'' < 0 \Rightarrow d_1^* < d_2^*$

• CRRA: 
$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

- $u'(c) = c^{-\gamma} \Longrightarrow u'(d_1)/u'(d_2) = (d_2/d_1)^{\gamma}$ 
  - if  $\gamma = 1 \Longrightarrow d_1^* = 1$ ,  $d_2^* = R$
  - if  $\gamma > 1 \Longrightarrow 1 < d_1^* < d_2^* < R$

## Why do bank runs occur?

- $\bullet \ \gamma > 1 \Longrightarrow 1 < d_1^* < d_2^* < R$
- IC:  $d_1 \le d_2$
- Expectation: Only the impatient depositors withdraw in period 1.
- $\bullet \ \, \text{A patient depositor can} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \gcd \ d_2^* & \text{if he withdraws in period 2} \\ \\ \gcd \ d_1^* & \text{if he withdraws in period 1} \end{array} \right.$

## Why do bank runs occur?

- $\gamma > 1 \Longrightarrow 1 < d_1^* < d_2^* < R$
- Expectation: All other depositors demand withdraw in period 1.
- A patient depositor can  $\begin{cases} \text{get } nothing & \text{if he withdraws in period 2} \\ \\ \text{get } d_1^* \text{ w.p. } \left(1/d_1^*\right) & \text{if he withdraws in period 1} \end{cases}$