

# Economics 4905: Lecture 5

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We recommend that you read or re-read Lectures 3 and 4 from [www.karlshell.com](http://www.karlshell.com) > COURSES > CURRENT > ECON 4905 FALL 2018.

## Review (Outside) Money Taxation:

- ▶ Bonafide Taxes  $\tau$
- ▶ Balanced Taxes  $\tau$
- ▶ Bonafide  $\tau \equiv$  Balanced  $\tau$
- ▶  $I = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{P}^m$  is interval  $[0, \bar{P}^m)$
- ▶  $I > 1$ ,  $\mathcal{P}^m$  is the union of intervals
- ▶ Multiple Currencies
- ▶ Problem Set 1
- ▶ Simple, *finite* static model

# Enriching the model to include dynamics and uncertainty: Debreu's isomorphism

- ▶ "Debreu" Isomorphism
  - ▶ Expand definition of commodity,  $x_h^{i,s,t}$
  - ▶ Commodity type  $i$ , state of nature  $s$ , time  $t$
  - ▶ Contingent claims
  - ▶ Futures Market
- ▶ Profit Maximization
  - ▶ Theorem
  - ▶ Not assumption
  - ▶ Diagrams

## Futures Market

- ▶  $t = 1, 2$
- ▶  $I = 1$
- ▶ present prices,  $(p^1, p^2) = (1, p^2)$

**CP:**

$$\max u_h(x_h^1, x_h^2)$$

e.g.  $u_h(x_h^1, x_h^2) = \phi_h(x_h^1) + \beta_h \phi_h(x_h^2)$

s.t.

$$p^1(x_h^1 - \omega_h^1) + p^2(x_h^2 - \omega_h^2) = 0$$

**CE:**  $(p^1, p^2)$  such that

$$\sum_h x_h^t = \sum_h \omega_h^t \text{ for } t = 1, 2$$

where  $x_h^t$  solves CP for  $t = 1, 2$ .

## Criticism of Futures Market Interpretation:

- ▶ Do we really choose today all our future consumptions?
- ▶ Do ordinary people use futures market for personal choices over time?
- ▶ Everyone on a "meal plan" for everything?
- ▶ FM model is real, i.e., non-financial. More stable, but less realistic?

## Inside Money Market for Dynamic Economy

- ▶ Spot market at each date,  $t = 1, 2$
- ▶ Saving and dis-saving through "money-market"
- ▶ Rational expectations about future spot prices
- ▶ Expectations play no role in FM model

## Inside Money, continued

**CP:**

$$\max u_h(x_h^1, x_h^2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{s.t. } p^1 x_h^1 + p^{m1} x_h^{m1} &= p^1 \omega_h^1 \\ p^2 x_h^2 + p^{m2} x_h^{m2} &= p^2 \omega_h^2 \\ x_h^{m1} + x_h^{m2} &= 0 \text{ or } x_h^{m2} = -x_h^{m1} \end{aligned}$$

**CE:**

$$(p^1, p^2; p^{m1}, p^{m2})$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{s.t. } \sum_h x_h^t &= \sum_h \omega_h^t \text{ for } t = 1, 2 \\ \sum_h x_h^{m,t} &= 0 \text{ for } t = 1, 2 \end{aligned}$$

where  $x_h^t$  and  $x_h^{m,t}$  satisfy CP for  $t = 1, 2$ .



## Simplifying and substituting

- ▶  $p^1(x_h^1 - \omega_h^1) = -p^{m1}x_h^{m1}$
- ▶  $p^2(x_h^2 - \omega_h^2) = p^{m2}x_h^{m1}$
- ▶  $x_h^{m1}$  is a slack variable permitting us to combine terms (discuss):

$$p^1(x_h^1 - \omega_h^1) + p^2(x_h^2 - \omega_h^2) = (p^{m2} - p^{m1})x_h^{m1}$$

- ▶ In MM, buy low sell high, try to arbitrage the  $(p^{m2} - p^{m1})$  gap
- ▶ allowing unbounded consumptions denying CE
- ▶ therefore in CE:  $p^{m1} = p^{m2} = p^m \geq 0$

Assume  $p^m > 0$

- ▶ We have

$$p^1(x_h^1 - \omega_h^1) + p^2(x_h^1 - \omega_h^1) = 0$$

- ▶ MM equilibrium allocation is identical to FM equilibrium allocation
- ▶ Irving Fisher (isomorphic to the Arrow article)
- ▶ Very important caveat
  - ▶ If  $p^m = 0$ , the money market is closed. No inter-temporal trades
  - ▶ This important outcome does not occur in the FM model

# Uncertainty

- ▶ Two states,  $s = \alpha, \beta$
- ▶ One commodity,  $l = 1$
- ▶ Finite model, as before
- ▶ See Arrow RES article: History of article
- ▶ Contingent claims
  - ▶ "AD"
  - ▶ buy and sell contracts to deliver commodity contingent on the realization of  $s$
- ▶ **CP:**

$$\max \pi(\alpha)u_h(x_h(\alpha)) + \pi(\beta)u_h(x_h(\beta))$$

$$\pi(\alpha) + \pi(\beta) = 1$$

$$\text{s.t. } p(\alpha)x_h(\alpha) + p(\beta)x_h(\beta) = p(\alpha)\omega_h(\alpha) + p(\beta)\omega_h(\beta)$$

## CE for "AD" Economy

$$p(\alpha), p(\beta)$$

such that

$$\sum_h x_h(s) = \sum_h \omega_h(s) \text{ for } s = \alpha, \beta$$

where  $x_h(s)$  solves CP for  $s = \alpha, \beta$ .

## Arrow Securities

- ▶ Arrow money
- ▶ Buy and sell commodities on spot markets
- ▶ Buy and sell Arrow monies  $b_h(s)$  for  $s = \alpha, \beta$  before  $s$  is realized

CP:

$$\max E_s u_h(s) = \pi(\alpha)u_h(x_h(\alpha)) + \pi(\beta)u_h(x_h(\beta))$$

$$\text{s.t. } x_h(s) = \omega_h(s) + b_h(s) \text{ for } s = \alpha, \beta$$

$$\text{and } p^b(\alpha)b_h(\alpha) + p^b(\beta)b_h(\beta) = 0$$

Hidden assumption: 1 unit of  $b_h(s)$  pays 1 unit of commodity in state  $s$ , 0 otherwise.

**CE:**

$$(p(\alpha), p(\beta); p^b(\alpha), p^b(\beta))$$

such that

$$\sum_h x_h(s) = \sum_h \omega_h(s) \text{ for } s = \alpha, \beta$$

where  $x_h(s)$  solves CP.

# Results

- ▶ Every CE allocation in the AD economy can be decentralized as a CE allocation in the Arrow Securities economy.
- ▶ Every CE allocation in the AS economy in which we have  $(p^b(\alpha), p^b(\beta)) \gg 0$  is also an equilibrium in the AD contingent claims economy.